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The G8, Globalization, and the Need for a Global Health Ethic 
 
Ted Schrecker  
 
  
Introduction: Why study the G8 and global health?  
 
In 2001, colleagues and I
1
 began the first ‘report card’ on how the actions and 
policies of the  G7/G8
2
 affected population health, in particular the health of 
populations outside the high-income countries (Labonte & Schrecker, 2004; 
Labonte, Schrecker, Sanders, & Meeus, 2004). The focus on the G7/G8 was and 
is justified for at least two reasons.  
 First, the G8 countries ‘account for 48% of the global economy and 49% 
of global trade, hold four of the United Nations’ five permanent Security Council 
seats, and boast majority shareholder control over the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank’ (Corlazzoli & Smith, eds., 2005, p. 5). They 
provide roughly 75 percent of the world’s development assistance; their deep 
pockets, organizational resources and superior bargaining power provide them 
with formidable advantages in trade negotiations and dispute resolution 
proceedings; and firms located within their borders have until recently been the 
primary sources of outward foreign direct investment (FDI).
3
  The decisions their 
governments make, individually and jointly, have unavoidable impacts on literally 
billions of people outside their own borders, whether or not those impacts are 
intended.  
 2 
 Second, although the G8 came into existence (as the G6) in response to a 
number of shocks in the international economic environment and initially were 
concerned mainly with macroeconomic policy coordination, annual Summits and 
periodic ministerial meetings – in particular, meetings of finance ministers – 
subsequently emerged as comparably important in a variety of social and 
economic policy fields. According to John Kirton, a leading academic observer of 
the G8, Summits ‘have value in establishing new principles in normative 
directions, in creating and highlighting issue areas and agenda items, and in 
altering the publicly allowable discourse used’ (Kirton et al., 2006, p. 3).  
Acknowledging both the dominant role of the G8 in the global economy and the 
function of Summits as ‘the only forum where heads of the major governments 
routinely meet’ (Collier, 2007, p. 13), development economist Paul Collier 
presented his important book The Bottom Billion as a development policy agenda 
for the G8. Whatever normative questions surround the legitimacy and 
accountability of G8 Summits and ministerial meetings, which are briefly 
addressed in the concluding section of this chapter, the facts of G8 influence on 
global affairs are beyond serious dispute.   
 The report card work initially addressed commitments made at the 1999 
through 2001 Summits, although subsequent publications updated the analysis to 
include the 2005 Summit at Gleneagles, which arguably represented the zenith of 
G8 interest in development issues as of mid-2008 (Labonte & Schrecker, 2005; 
Labonte, Schrecker, & Gupta, 2005; Labonte & Schrecker, 2006; Schrecker, 
Labonte, & Sanders, 2007; Labonte & Schrecker, 2007a). We first considered the 
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extent to which G8 countries had lived up to their Summit commitments. 
However, we examined not only commitments that directly referred to health, but 
also commitments in a variety of other policy fields that affect social determinants 
of health (SDH): the conditions that make it relatively easy for some people to 
lead long and healthy lives, and all but impossible for others. These policy fields 
included education and nutrition; development assistance; trade policy and market 
access; macroeconomic policy and poverty reduction; and debt relief.
4
 
Furthermore, we examined not only the extent to which the G8 had fulfilled or 
complied with their commitments, but also the adequacy of those commitments 
when measured against the nature and scale of unmet needs and with the 
appropriateness of commitments, based on what is known about influences on 
health outcomes. In other words, we were and are concerned not only with 
whether the G8, individually and collectively, have done what they said they 
would do but also with whether they committed themselves to doing enough, and 
doing what the evidence indicates is necessary.  
      
Globalization, development and health  
 
Describing the health implications of Summit commitments and G8 policies 
outside the health care field requires that researchers ‘work backward’ from what 
is known about the elements of daily life that increase probability of illness or 
injury, while simultaneously ‘working forward’ from different bodies of evidence 
relevant to how policy choices and dynamics at the national and international 
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level influence those elements. For much of the world’s population, the most 
important influence on those elements of daily life is undoubtedly transnational 
economic integration (globalization): societies rich and poor alike are becoming 
part of the global marketplace, in various ways and on various terms.  
 Globalization influences social determinants of health by way of multiple 
pathways that are often complex and contested (Labonte & Schrecker, 2007b). 
For instance, controversy surrounds globalization’s implications for economic 
growth and poverty reduction. Over the long term, and with considerable 
variation at any given income level, richer societies are healthier (World Bank, 
1993; Deaton, 2003) and socioeconomic gradients in health are present in 
societies rich and poor alike, with the relatively poor exhibiting poorer health (see 
Figure 1). If globalization could be shown to be reliable and effective in 
increasing growth rates and reducing poverty, then a strong initial presumption 
would exist that measures to promote globalization, such as trade liberalization, 
should be embraced for their health benefits (Feachem, 2001). 
  
  -- Insert Figure 1 about here –  
 
 However, the evidence that globalization contributes either to economic 
growth or to poverty reduction is at best equivocal, depending inter alia on how 
one assesses the extent to which national economies have been integrated into the 
global marketplace; how poverty is defined; and how many uncertainties about 
data quality one is willing to live with or overlook (Milanovic, 2003; 
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Satterthwaite, 2003; Reddy & Pogge, 2005; Kawachi & Wamala, 2007). Between 
1981 and 2004, while the value of the world’s economic output quadrupled, only 
modest poverty reductions were recorded even based on the World Bank’s 
contentious $1/day and $2/day poverty lines.
5
 The reduction in global poverty at 
the $1/day level is due entirely to poverty reduction in China, with gains 
elsewhere in the world being offset by increases in the number of poor people 
elsewhere, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. Almost half the world’s people, 
including 1.3 billion classified by the International Labour Organization (2008, p. 
10) as employed, live on incomes at or below the $2/day income level. There was 
almost no change in the number of people worldwide living on $2/day or less; in 
this case, reductions in China were more than offset by increases in the number of 
poor people in south Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Chen & Ravallion, 2007).  
 Indeed, at least during the post-1980 period economic growth proved 
remarkably ineffective in reducing poverty (Woodward & Simms, 2006); an 
innovative econometric study completed in 2007 suggests that globalization may 
actually have reduced the extent to which the growth that does occur is translated 
into improvements in health status (Cornia, Rosignoli, & Tiberti, 2008). Even 
globalization’s enthusiasts concede that there may be substantial numbers of 
losers within national economies. Thus, the only responsible answer to questions 
about globalization and poverty reduction is that ‘the net effects of globalization 
on the poor can only be judged on the basis of ‘context-specific’ empirical 
studies’ (Nissanke & Thorbecke, 2006, p. 1340).      
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 Even if the connection between globalization and growth were stronger, 
then, promoting globalization would not fulfil the commitment made by the G8 in 
2001 to ‘make globalization work for all [their] citizens and especially the world's 
poor’ (G8, 2001, ¶3). Once almost heretical, this perspective has now entered the 
mainstream of development policy discourse – notably, by way of a number of 
recent research syntheses and consultative processes. The International Labour 
Organization’s World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization 
(2004) organized its recommendations around the idea of ‘fair globalization’ and 
addressed inter alia the need for reform of trade, the international financial 
system, labour standards, and development financing. In its 2005 report the UN 
Millennium Project, established as an advisory body to the Secretary-General, 
mustered a prodigious amount of evidence to support its arguments for organizing 
development assistance, trade policy, and scientific research around the 
imperative of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) derived 
from a resolution passed by the the United Nations General Assembly in 2000.
6
 
Also in 2005 the multinational Commission for Africa, convened by the British 
government as part of the lead-up to the 2005 G8 Summit, argued for similar 
reforms with specific reference to the development needs of sub-Saharan Africa 
(Commission for Africa, 2005). The United Nations Development Programme 
(through annual Human Development Reports) and the UN’s Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, although somewhat marginalized within the UN 
system, nevertheless continue to demonstrate the incomplete and unequally 
distributed benefits of globalization. In this they are joined by a growing number 
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of social scientists who recognize the ‘disequalizing’ dynamics of the global 
marketplace and the ‘asymmetrical’ distribution not only of its benefits, but also 
of the ability to influence its rules and institutions (Birdsall, 2006a; Birdsall, 
2006b).   
 As production has been reorganized across multiple national boundaries 
(Dicken, 2007), genuinely global labour markets have emerged. National and sub-
national jurisdictions can be played off against one another based on labour costs 
and ‘flexibility’, and redistributive policies are constrained by the possibility of 
disinvestment and capital flight (Williamson, 2004; Evans, 2005; Mosley, 2006). 
Cerny has described this dynamic in terms of pressure for policy convergence 
toward the competition state, focused on ‘promotion of economic activities, 
whether at home or abroad, which will make firms and sectors located within the 
territory of the state competitive in international markets’ (Cerny, 2000, p. 136). 
The rise of the competition state is accompanied by far-reaching redefinition of 
citizenship rights, which even in formal democracies are increasingly held not by 
individuals as members of a polity but rather by transnational corporations 
(TNCs) and players in the global financial markets. ‘These markets can now 
exercise the accountability functions associated with citizenship: they can vote 
governments’ economic policies in or out, they can force governments to take 
certain measures and not others’ (Sassen, 2003, p. 70; see generally Sassen, 
1996).  A parallel development, albeit structurally related, is the infusion of the 
logic of the marketplace into domestic economic and social policy.  Individuals 
and households, like sectors of national economies, are expected to ‘earn their 
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keep’ in the new global environment. Social policies are organized around the 
anticipated return on investment in “human capital” (Giddens, 1998; Jenson & 
Saint-Martin, 2003; Molyneux, 2007) and citizenship is redefined within national 
borders in terms of effective participation in the domestic and global marketplace 
as a producer or consumer.
7
    
 
The G8 and health: challenges  
 
The assessment presented here concentrates on official development assistance 
(ODA), debt relief, trade policy and support for health systems. These are by no 
means the only areas of G8 policy that are relevant to population health, but taken 
together they strongly influence both the volume of resources available to meet 
basic health-related needs such as those related to income, nutrition and education 
in much of the developing world and the policy environment for meeting those 
needs, to the point where shortcomings in these areas are unlikely to be offset by 
initiatives in others.  
  An immediate need exists for increased resources to support national 
health systems (Schieber, Gottret, Fleisher, & Leive, 2007; Ooms, Van Damme, 
Baker, Zeitz, & Schrecker, 2008). Despite substantial increases in development 
assistance for health in recent years, publicly financed health systems in low- and 
some middle-income countries remain drastically underfunded relative to the 
costs of ‘a rather minimal health system,’ estimated by the World Health 
Organization’s Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (Commission on 
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Macroeconomics and Health, 2001) as $34/capita ($40 in 2007 dollars). By 
comparison, annual per capita health spending from all sources, public and 
private, in the Least Developed Countries (as defined by the United Nations) 
where 770 million people live is $15 (World Bank Health, 2007)). To provide 
basic health care, such countries will need to rely on infusions of external 
resources well into the future. Jeffrey Sachs, who chaired the both the 
Commission and the Millennium Project, estimates that poor sub-Saharan 
countries might be capable of generating US $50 per capita in total annual public 
revenue, out of which ‘ [t]he health sector is lucky to claim $10 per person per 
year out of this, but even rudimentary health care requires roughly four times that 
amount …. Foreign aid is therefore not a luxury for African health. It is a life-
and-death necessity’ (Sachs, 2007). His argument is not relevant only to sub-
Saharan Africa: think for example of Haiti, the poorest country in the Western 
Hemisphere, or Vietnam, where public sector spending on health care was just US 
$4/capita as recently as 2001 (United Nations Country Team Viet Nam, 2003).   
 A similarly savage arithmetic applies to the need for development 
assistance more generally. The Commission for Africa and the Millennium 
Project each argued that approximate doubling of the industrialized world’s 
development assistance spending circa 2005 was needed and justified within a 
relatively short time frame. Each body acknowledged recurring (and legitimate) 
concerns about the effectiveness of aid, but emphasized donor rather than 
recipient policies and practices as constraints on aid effectiveness, the Millennium 
Project noting inter alia that ‘the notion of taking the [Millennium Development] 
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Goals seriously remains highly unorthodox among development practitioners’ 
because of a lack of financial support from the industrialized world (UN 
Millennium Project, 2005, p. 202; see also p. 59). If nothing else, these and 
related findings (see e.g. Collier, 2006a; Collier, 2006b) should have shifted the 
burden of proof to the aid sceptics: those who claim that improvements in health 
can be achieved without substantial and predictable increases in aid flows. They 
do, however, leave open an important question about whether aid’s effectiveness 
should be assessed primarily with reference to its contribution to economic 
growth, or rather with reference to its contribution to meeting basic needs. While 
the Millennium Project emphasized the importance of using aid more effectively 
in support of the MDGs, the effectiveness of aid is frequently equated with its 
contribution to economic growth; indeed Killick (2005, p. 19) argues that less 
attention should be paid to the MDGs and poverty reduction, and more to 
‘promoting the development of directly productive sectors.’ Here as elsewhere, 
the need exists for an explicitly normative perspective on development policy 
choices.  
  External debt has been recognized for at least two decades as 
undermining developing countries’ ability to meet basic needs (Cornia, Jolly, & 
Stewart, eds., 1987; Cheru, 1999).  One of the most serious constraints on aid’s 
effectiveness is that ‘dozens of heavily indebted poor and middle-income 
countries are forced by creditor governments to spend large parts of their limited 
tax receipts on debt service, undermining their ability to finance investments in 
human capital and infrastructure.  In a pointless and debilitating churning of 
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resources, the creditors provide development assistance with one hand and then 
withdraw it in debt servicing with the other’ (UN Millennium Project, 2005, p. 35; 
see also Figure 2.) With this observation, the Millennium Project reinforced 
numerous earlier critiques by academic researchers and civil society 
organizations. Debt relief does not automatically bring about increased 
expenditure on basic needs, although this has happened in some countries 
following the past decade’s multilateral initiatives (Gupta, Clements, Guin-Siu, & 
Leruth, 2002). Much more needs to happen, not least because of the relatively 
modest increase that even complete debt cancellation would provide in the 
revenues available to many governments in low-income countries (Schieber et al., 
2007). Like increased development assistance, easing the debt burden of 
developing economies is best viewed as a necessary rather than a sufficient 
condition for improving access to basic needs. 
 
  -- Insert Figure 2 about here –   
 
 Then there is trade. Development policy protagonists who disagree about 
much else agree that improving market access for developing country exports is 
indispensable for growth, poverty reduction and associated improvements in 
social determinants of health. Researchers and many developing country 
governments attach special importance to eliminating agricultural subsidies that 
lower world prices and limit developing country export opportunities (Watkins & 
Fowler, 2002; Commission for Africa, 2005), although the actual magnitude and 
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distribution of benefits from agricultural trade liberalization remains uncertain 
(Wise, 2004; Birdsall, Rodrik, & Subramanian, 2005; McMillan, Zwane, & 
Ashraf, 2006). Within the industrialized countries agricultural subsidies are often 
justified in populist terms, yet they mainly benefit the richest agricultural 
producers and agribusiness firms (Commission for Africa, 2005, p. 279-284; 
United Nations Development Programme, 2005, p. 130). Both within and outside 
the agricultural sector, a source of special concern is the tendency of 
industrialized countries to apply much higher tariffs (tariff peaks) to labour-
intensive exports, which are of special importance to many developing countries, 
than they do to raw or semi-processed commodities (IMF Staff, 2002). The irony 
is bitter because some developing countries have destroyed domestic industries by 
opening their markets to imports, accepting the resulting social dislocations as the 
price of global integration (Jeter, 2002; Atarah, 2005). The research literature 
does not appear to include a systematic inventory of such cases, suggesting an 
important area for future research.   
 A further dimension of the relation between trade and SDH, one widely 
neglected in the country-specific research literature, involves the effects of tariff 
reductions. Tariffs are an important source of revenue for many low- and middle-
income countries, as they were for today’s high-income countries before and during the 
early stages of their transition to industrialization.
8
 The best available research shows 
that many middle-income countries, and especially low-income countries, have been 
unable to make up from other sources more than a fraction of the tariff revenues lost 
from trade liberalization (Baunsgaard & Keen, 2005; see also Aizenman & Jinjarak, 
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2006).
9
 Commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) or in 
a proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements may open up health care as 
well as services such as water and sewage treatment to private investment, ‘locking in’ 
privatization and its associated barriers to access to services by the poor and 
economically insecure. Finally, despite an interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) that apparently preserves flexibility in 
response to crises such as the AIDS epidemic, it is far from clear that intellectual 
property rights have been removed as a barrier to ensuring access to essential 
medicines ‘on the ground’ in developing countries (Haakonsson & Richey, 2007; Kerry 
& Lee, 2007; United States Government Accountability Office, 2007; Correa, 2008).   
   
The G8 and health: responses   
 
The G8 Gleneagles commitment to double development assistance to Africa by 
2010, a promised annual increase of $25 billion, was driven primarily by the 
European Union (EU). Although aid spending in 2005 increased, it included 
major one-off debt cancellations for strategically important and oil-rich Iraq and 
Nigeria. The industrialized world’s overall development assistance spending fell 
by 5.1 percent in 2006, and by a further 8.4 percent in 2007 (OECD Development 
Assistance Committee, 2007; OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2008). 
The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee warned in April, 2008 that 
‘most donors are not on track to meet their stated commitments to scale up aid; 
 14 
they will need to make unprecedented increases to meet their 2010 targets’ 
(OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2008).  
 Provision of health care and public health interventions is likely to be one 
casualty of failure. The Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria is the G8’s flagship global health initiative, established in recognition of 
the need to mobilize additional resources and to find more effective ways of 
delivering those resources. Although the G8 claimed at the 2001 Summit that the 
Global Fund would ‘make a quantum leap in the fight against infectious diseases 
and … break the vicious cycle between disease and poverty’ (G8, 2001, ¶15), the 
Fund lacks a stable, long-term financing mechanism; it relies instead on periodic 
replenishment meetings where it essentially passes a hat among donors. Over the 
2005-2008 period, the G8 failed to make commitments that would provide a long-
term funding base for the Global Fund. It could be argued that the 2007 promise 
to ‘provide predictable, long-term additional funding in the ongoing 
replenishment round’ (G8, 2007) was partly met at the September, 2007 
replenishment meeting that elicited pledges of $9.7 billion for the period 2008-
2010: an improvement over previous commitments, but this amount is still far 
below the Fund’s anticipated resource needs of $12-18 billion for the period 
(Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 2007). Furthermore, former UN Special Envoy on 
AIDS Stephen Lewis warned in 2006 that ‘what is happening, in a very insidious 
way, is that African governments are being discouraged from asking for what they 
really need from the Global Fund. The word is out, and it’s often reinforced by 
Western diplomats at country level -- don't ask for too much, because the Global 
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Fund just doesn't have the resources.’ Consequently, ‘governments are reluctant 
to ask for what they really need, lest their whole proposal be turned down.  They 
undershoot the level, in order to accommodate the G8 refusal to fund the Global 
Fund at the levels required’ (quoted in Cook, 2006).  
 The inadequacy of the resources available to the Fund is dramatized by a 
proposal to expand the Fund’s mandate beyond three specified diseases to 
financing comprehensive country health programs, thereby responding to a 
frequent claim that disease-specific programs undermine already fragile national 
health systems. In order to ensure the availability of the $40 minimum per capita 
cost of a basic health care system, as per the Commission on Macroeconomics 
and Health estimate, the Fund would need to be prepared to disburse US $28 
billion per year, even if it did not provide any funds to countries where spending 
on health already exceeds that level and even if all recipient countries committed 
3 percent of GDP to public spending on health care -- something many low-
income countries are far from doing (Ooms et al., 2008).   
 The G8 record on debt relief is one of gradual and grudging, but 
consequential, response. Starting in the 1999 the G8 led the industrialized world 
in partially cancelling the debts of up to 40 countries, 32 of them in Africa, under 
the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. ‘[T]he amount 
of debt relief … was determined by eligibility thresholds which (according to 
public statements by [International Monetary] Fund and [World] Bank officials) 
were based on initial analysis… and then modified to suit political compromises 
amongst G7 creditors, balancing the need to include strategic G7 allies and their 
 16 
desire to keep costs down’(Martin, 2004, p. 17). Eligibility thresholds are based 
on a ratio of anticipated export earnings to debt service obligations; partly because 
of undue optimism about export performance, HIPCs’ progress toward meeting 
basic needs and reducing debt burdens has been inadequate (United Nations 
Secretary-General, 2006). Many saw only modest decreases in their debt service 
obligations; three – Mali, Mozambique and Bolivia – had actually experienced 
increases in these obligations as of 2005 (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, 2005, p. 148). Eligibility for debt cancellation was 
and is accompanied by the requirement that macroeconomic policies be approved 
by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, creating what some 
observers view as a destructive reprise of earlier conditionalities aimed at 
integrating national economies into the global marketplace (Cheru, 2000; Cheru, 
2001; Gore, 2004; Gaynor, 2005). 
 At Gleneagles, the G8 agreed to cancel an additional US $40 - $56 billion 
of debts owed by HIPCs to the World Bank, IMF and the concessional arm of the 
African Development Bank once they have reached their ‘completion point’ under 
the earlier initiative. This Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) was 
welcome and overdue, yet it is incomplete and compromised. Development 
assistance to recipient countries will be reduced by some or all of the amount of 
additional debt relief provided under MDRI (Joint World Bank/IMF Development 
Committee, 2005; Tomitova, 2005). The shell game may enter a new round if 
donor countries, mainly the G8, do not fully fund the requisite levels of debt relief 
through the World Bank, thus reducing the budget of the International 
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Development Association (IDA), the branch of the Bank that offers grants and 
below-market loans (Hurley, 2007). No mechanism exists to require participation 
of private sector creditors in multilateral debt relief initiatives. In addition, debt 
relief will not be extended to many countries that are not statistically desperate 
enough to qualify, despite high levels of poverty (only a minority of the world’s 
poor live in HIPCs; see Labonte & Schrecker, 2004, p. 1665-1666) and high 
external debt burdens (Hanlon, 2000; Pearce, Greenhill, & Glennie, 2005).   
 The G8 have consistently failed, at least for public consumption, to 
address two fundamental questions. First, what justifies the definition of 
sustainability of external debt for purposes of determining eligibility for debt 
relief, and what is the ethical justification for the criteria chosen? The current 
criterion, based on a country’s ability to service its debts from export earnings, 
prioritizes the interests of creditors. An alternative definition of sustainability 
instead prioritizes the ability of governments to undertake public expenditure to 
meet basic needs or achieve the MDGs, and then works backward to determine 
how much of the public budget, if any, should be devoted to debt repayment. 
Calculations using this approach indicate a need for far more extensive debt 
cancellation, for a much larger number of countries, than available under MDRI 
(UN Millennium Project, 2005; United Nations, 2005; Mandel, 2006). 
Exemplifying this approach is the New Economics Foundation proposal to 
structure debt cancellation around ensuring that debtor countries have  available 
the resources needed to raise the living standard of their poorest residents to an 
‘ethical poverty line’ of $3/person/day, as contrasted with the World Bank 
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poverty thresholds. On this basis, a total of 136 countries would require either 
complete or partial debt cancellation with a net present value of between $424 and 
$589 billion -- i.e., a fivefold increase relative to the amounts of debt cancellation 
available under the combined enhanced HIPC and MDRI initiatives, for a much 
longer list of countries (Mandel, 2006).   
 Second, should ‘odious debts’ incurred by repressive or corrupt 
governments without the consent of their subjects be regarded as collectable 
under international law (Khalfan, King, & Thomas, 2003)? The Commission for 
Africa cited an estimate ‘that stolen African assets equivalent to more than half of 
the continent’s external debt are held in foreign bank accounts’ (Commission for 
Africa, 2005 p. 150); other estimates of capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa 
yield an even higher figure (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2003). In 2005, the G8 
committed themselves to ‘[w]ork vigorously for early ratification of the UN 
Convention Against Corruption and start discussions on mechanisms to ensure its 
effective implementation’ (G8, 2005), although as of July, 2008 Germany, Italy 
and Japan had yet to ratify the Convention. The Convention is potentially 
valuable because it binds parties to implement mechanisms to seize and repatriate 
illegally appropriated assets. Its effectiveness will depend on the commitment of 
governments whose subjects have been victimized; this is by no means assured 
(Rice, Campbell, & White, 2007), although the G8 could provide encouragement 
in several ways.
10 Even if ratified by all members of the G8 the Convention 
cannot substitute for a systematic initiative to define odious debts; to develop 
multilateral mechanisms to preclude their collection (by either public- or private-
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sector creditors); and to ensure that cancelling debts run up by brutal and 
unaccountable regimes cannot be counted as development assistance, as is now 
the case.  
 On trade, although substantial opportunities exist to reshape trade policy 
in a way that is simultaneously and synergistically development-friendly and 
supportive of improvements in health, the challenges are formidable. The G8 
claimed in 2002 that:‘The launch of multilateral trade negotiations by World 
Trade Organization (WTO) members in Doha … placed the needs and interests of 
developing countries at the heart of the negotiations’ (G8, 2002). Similar rhetoric 
in following years culminated in the 2006 Summit’s call ‘for a concerted effort to 
conclude the negotiations of the WTO's Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and 
to fulfill the development objective of the Round’ (G8, 2006, ¶1). Only days later, 
negotiations reached an impasse over the issue of agricultural subsidies, and a 
similar collapse terminated a subsequent round of talks in July, 2008 (Castle & 
Landler, 2008). Expectations for the Doha round may always have been too high 
(Ricupeiro, 2006), and the failure is perhaps not surprising, since introducing 
development goals into trade policy would mean a fundamental shift in the self-
interested character of negotiations as they now exist (Stiglitz & Charlton, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the continued impasse underscores the need for G8 leadership – 
assuming, that is, that the rhetoric of commitment to integrating development 
objectives into trade policy is to be taken seriously. Collier has recommended that 
if the OECD countries as a whole were interested in unblocking WTO 
negotiations, they might jointly and unilaterally offer improved access to certain 
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sectors of their markets, in order to revitalize the negotiating process by way of an 
up-front incentive to developing country governments that is not conditional on 
subsequent bargaining -- in other words, adding an explicitly redistributive 
component (Collier, 2006c). No evidence to date suggests that this proposal has 
been taken seriously by the G7. On other trade issues, the lack of concrete 
proposals relating to the effects of intellectual property protection on access to 
essential medicines, and the fact that the United States has sought stronger, 
‘TRIPs-plus’ intellectual property protection in its bilateral and regional trade 
agreements (Fink & Reichenmuller, 2006; United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2007), are not reassuring.    
 
Conclusion: Whither (or wither?) the G8 and global health?   
  
How much can be expected from the G8 in terms of policies that improve 
population health? Many international relations scholars think it unrealistic to 
expect that the foreign policies of powerful national governments will ever be 
driven by considerations other than national economic
11
 and geopolitical interest. 
On this view, the G8 can be expected to adopt measures favourable to the health 
of those outside the industrialized world only when these will generate domestic 
political payoffs or enhance the competitive advantage of national economies and 
firms within their borders (Cerny’s competition state).  
 It could therefore be argued that the most productive route for advocacy 
involves appeals to enlightened self-interest, notably by linking health with 
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security. Unfortunately, the claim that ‘better health for anyone, anywhere on 
earth, benefits everyone else’ (Global Forum for Health Research, 2002, p. 35) is 
vacuous. Although such developments as rapid, low-cost air travel and the global 
reorganization of food production have increased possibilities for disease 
transmission, direct danger to most people in high-income countries is probably 
limited to a small range of diseases, such as SARS and influenza, which can be 
easily transmitted through casual contact before symptoms develop. Not 
surprisingly, the 2006 Summit statement on infectious diseases was mainly 
concerned with planning for an influenza epidemic in the industrialized world. 
Arguably a more serious travel- and migration-linked threat is spread of resistance 
to antimicrobial drugs, which compromises treatments for a wide range of 
diseases (Okeke et al., 2005a; Okeke et al., 2005b; Zhang, Eggleston, Rotimi, & 
Zeckhauser, 2006); control of antimicrobial resistance may be one of the few true 
global public goods for health. However, only the occasional intrepid adventure 
traveler or tropical disease researcher is likely to be exposed to malaria. Most G8 
residents have nothing to lose from the HIV epidemic in developing countries, 
from the social conditions that contribute to vulnerability to tuberculosis or HIV 
infection (Bates et al., 2004; De Vogli & Birbeck, 2005), or from the rapid 
increase outside the industrialized world in the prevalence of non-communicable 
diseases that were once mistakenly thought to be diseases of affluence (Adeyi, 
Smith, & Robles, 2007). The global distribution of health risks, in other words, 
parallels and reflects the distribution of economic (dis)advantage that is 
characteristic of contemporary globalization. Appeals to self-interest on this score 
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are unlikely to be credible either to leaders or to G8 electorates that understand, at 
least in general terms, the nature and extent of their risk exposure.  
 More fundamentally, the legitimacy of the G8 as a forum for making 
decisions that affect the health of the entire world is challenged with increasing 
frequency. For instance, a 2008 Lancet editorial called it ‘preposterous and unjust 
to allow the leaders of eight countries that command 65% of the Gross World 
Product and represent only 13% of the world’s population to assume the mantle of 
governance about issues that concern the entire world’s economy, environment, 
health, and security’(MacDonald & Horton, 2008, p. 100, citations omitted). Ash 
has proposed building on the informal and partial inclusion of additional countries 
in recent Summits by adding China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and 
Indonesia to the club (Ash, 2008). Former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin 
and several international relations scholars (English, Thakur, & Cooper, eds. 
2005; Thompson, 2005) have advocated further expansion into an L20 (or 
Leaders’ 20), building on an existing forum for finance ministers by adding to the 
list of countries above Argentina, Australia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey.  
 Bradford (2005) enthuses about this proposal as as a way of overcoming 
‘global economic apartheid,’ but it might in fact deepen the gap between excluded 
and included states by leaving out (for example) all the Nordic countries and all of 
Africa except South Africa, a country that some argue now has a ‘sub-imperial’ 
relationship with the rest of the continent (Bond, 2004). Furthermore, the record 
of several countries proposed for inclusion, notably China, India and South 
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Africa, with respect to health disparities and SDH within their own borders is far 
from reassuring. China has marketized much of its system for providing health 
care, leading to increased difficulties in access for many and exacerbating 
problems associated with the rapid increase in economic inequality (see e.g. 
(Akin, Dow, Lance, & Loh, 2005; Office of the World Health Organization 
Representative in China, 2005; Dummer & Cook, 2007; Wong, Tang, & Lo, 
2007). The main trade union congress in the United States, admittedly not an 
uninterested party, has documented a pattern of extremely long working hours, 
lack of labour standards, and hazardous working conditions leading to accidents 
that kill 140,000 workers every year (AFL-CIO, Cardin, & Smith, 2006). India 
actively displaces slum dwellers in order to create space for commercial 
development (Appadurai, 2000; Dupont, 2008), and its policy priorities have 
prompted the United Nations Development Programme (2005 p. 30-31) to 
observe that: ‘Were India to show the same level of dynamism and innovation in 
tackling basic health inequalities as it has displayed in global technology markets, 
it could rapidly get on track for achieving the MDG targets’. South Africa’s 
government for a long fiercely resisted publicly funded provision of antiretroviral 
therapy, and its macroeconomic policies have resulted in devastatingly high, and 
persistent, unemployment and poverty rates (Koelble, 2004; Streak, 2004; 
Kingdon & Knight, 2005). 
  It can be argued that the situations described are no worse than those that 
obtained in the G8 countries at comparable stages of development -- and, further, 
that they represent in part responses to the constraints created by globalization. 
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Domestic politics come into play as well, and governments in countries rich and 
poor alike respond to the preferences of domestic constituencies roughly in 
proportion to the political resources those constituencies can deploy -- resources 
that are, of course, augmented or diminished by globalization. The point here with 
respect to G8 reform is simply that expanding the club will not necessarily change 
the orientation of its member governments to issues of equity and distribution as 
they affect population health, either within or across national borders.  
 These observations are made without the detailed explication they deserve, 
but nevertheless suggest that progress toward policies that generate widely shared 
improvements in population health is likely to depend on effective advocacy, in 
the first instance at least at the level of domestic politics, of some form of global 
health ethic that is explicit about the need for priorities other than those of the 
global marketplace. Obligations related to the health of people outside a country’s 
borders are recognized with increasing frequency (Labonté & Schrecker, 2007a), 
based on an expanding body of philosophical argument  most closely associated 
with Thomas Pogge (Pogge, 2002; Pogge, 2005; Pogge, 2007, but see also 
Moellendorf, 2002). In my own view, the obligations in question must reflect the 
problematic nature of resource ‘scarcities’ for basic health-related purposes such 
as saving the lives of six million children under the age of five in developing 
countries every year (Bryce et al., 2005), against a background of unprecedented 
abundance (Schrecker, 2008). As Sachs has said, ‘in a world of trillions of dollars 
of income every year, the amount of money that you need to address the health 
crises is easily available in the world’ (Sachs, 2003). 
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 One example suffices to illustrate the heuristic value of such a critical 
approach to scarcity. The author of a thoughtful critique of the politics behind the 
2005 Gleneagles Summit characterized as ‘astonishing’ the US $169 billion in 
additional funds over the 2005-10 period that would be needed to bring the G7’s 
development assistance spending up to the 0.7 percent of Gross National Income 
that has been a non-binding United Nations target since 1970 (Payne, 2006 p. 
926). Subsequent developments underscore the hypocrisy of the rhetoric of 
making poverty history that permeated the 2005 Summit, and as noted earlier 
development assistance is only one of several channels of global redistribution, 
and its effects must be assessed in the context of overall global resource flows. 
Yet Norway, Denmark and Sweden have consistently met or exceeded the 0.7 
percent target for two decades, and the amounts in question fade to insignificance 
beside the G8’s annual military spending. A less familiar comparison breaks 
down the amounts needed to bring each G7 country’s development assistance 
spending to the 0.7 percent target in terms of Big Macs per person per year, using 
The Economist’s annual price comparison of that common gastrocommodity 
(Figure 3). The resulting amounts are modest, suggesting along with previously 
cited comparisons that astonishment is in the eye of the beholder, and beholder 
perceptions tend to vary widely among national contexts.    
 
   -- Insert Figure 3 about here – 
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 Philosophers do not make public policy, which is probably a good thing, 
and even using the language of global ethics often incurs the derision of one’s 
colleagues. That derision may reflect a pragmatic appraisal of today’s political 
climate, which at least within the Anglo-American countries with which I am 
most familiar could hardly be less hospitable. Although ‘solidarity’ is routinely 
invoked even by governments of the centre-right in discussing access to health 
services in continental Europe, a recent content analysis did not even find the term 
in Canadian health policy reform documents (Flood, Stabile, & Tuohy, 2002; 
Giacomini, Hurley, Gold, Smith, & Abelson, 2004).  Further research is needed 
on the reasons for these international contrasts, their relation to globalization as 
mediated by domestic class structures and political allegiances, and the 
consequences for foreign policy as it affects health. Meanwhile, against the 
derision must be counterposed a long tradition of rigorous, engaged scholarship 
by such authors as Richard Falk and Susan George who insist on applying ethical 
standards to foreign policy and international relations.
12
 Those of us who are 
committed to some form of global redistribution as ethically imperative based on 
its role in improving population health must draw strength from their examples 
and others’, maintaining optimism as advocates and humanists while often 
undertaking a willing suspension of disbelief as social scientists.     
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Figure 1. Socioeconomic gradients in under-5 mortality, by household wealth 
quintiles, selected countries 
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  Source: Data from Gwatkin et al., 2007.  
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Figure 2.  Debt service and development assistance, by region, 2000-2005   
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators [on-line], accessed March, 2008.  Note that 
‘spikes’ in development assistance for the Middle East and North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa 
in 2005 reflect one-off debt cancellation offered to Iraq and Nigeria, which counts as 
development assistance. As noted in the text, development assistance figures for 2006 and 
preliminary figures for 2007 show a reversion to pattern.   
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Figure 3. Additional cost to the G7 nations in 2007 of spending 0.7 percent of 
GNI on development assistance, in Big Macs per capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2008; Big Mac prices from 
Anon, 2007. 
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Notes 
 
 
1
  This chapter draws on findings from several years of research collaboration 
with Ronald Labonte and David Sanders. I am indebted as well to many members 
of the Globalization Knowledge Network (Labonte et al., 2007) of the WHO 
Commission on Social Determinants of Health, for which I acted as Hub 
coordinator. All views expressed and conclusions drawn are exclusively my own 
unless attributed to cited authors. 
2
  The Russian Federation achieved partial membership of the Group of 7 
industrialized countries, making it the G8, in 1998 and full membership in 2003.  
However, Russia still does not participate in the periodic meetings of finance 
ministers that have become an important element of the Group’s activities. Thus, 
some references in this chapter are to the G7, as appropriate to the context.  
3
 Signs that this may be changing include the acquisition in 2006 of Canadian 
mining giant Inco Ltd. by Brazil’s Companhia Vale do Rio Doce; the acquisition 
in 2008 of Ford Motor Company’s Jaguar and Land Rover brands by India’s Tata 
Motors; and an emerging pattern of Chinese direct investment in mining and oil 
and gas extraction. A valuable treatement discussion of the emergence of world-
scale transnational corporations based in developing countries is provided by 
Goldstein, 2007. 
4
  The importance of SDH, well established in the research literature (Evans & 
Stoddart, 1990; Marmot & Wilkinson, eds. 2006), was recognized in 2005 by the 
World Health Organization’s establishment of a multinational Commission on 
Social Determinants of Health (World Health Organization, 2008). 
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5
  These define poverty with reference to incomes of US $1 and $2/day (in 1985 
dollars, at purchasing power parity). These thresholds were originally developed 
based on a number of national poverty lines, rather than on any direct relation to 
the actual cost of a minimal market basket of goods in a particular national or 
subnational economy. This is just one of several grounds on which they are often 
criticized (for a detailed critique see Woodward & Abdallah, in press).  
6
   Three of the MDGs are explicitly health-related, and four others directly 
address crucial social determinants of (ill) health.  The MDGs have numerous 
shortcomings as policy objectives (Pogge, 2004; Gwatkin, 2005; Moser, Leon, & 
Gwatkin, 2005), yet have the merit of recognizing at least implicitly ‘that many of 
the most devastating problems that plague the daily lives of billions of people are 
problems that emerge from a single, fundamental source: the consequences of 
poverty and inequality’ (Paluzzi & Farmer, 2005, p. 12).   
7
  For an eloquent description of this process as it has unfolded in Chile, based on 
extensive fieldwork, see Schild, 1998; Schild, 2000; Schild, 2007 and also 
Cooper, 1998. 
8
 This is why smuggling was both a capital offence and a frequent axis of class 
conflict at the local level in eighteenth-century England (Winslow, 1975).  
9
 Baunsgaard & Keen (2005) found that middle-income countries had been able to 
recover 45-60 cents of each dollar lost in tariff revenue, while low-income 
countries had recovered 30 cents or less of each dollar lost. Against the 
background realization that the revenue base in most such countries was already 
insufficient to support public provision of basic needs, the impact of such revenue 
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losses can best be understood by way of a thought-experiment in which national 
general government revenues in a high-income country like Canada or Sweden 
were reduced by somewhere between 40 and 70 percent over a relatively short 
period of time. Who would lose first, and worst, from the resulting cutbacks in 
service provision?    
10
  Perhaps, in some cases, by linking eligibility for debt relief to specific asset 
repatriation initatives. It is, of course, difficult to envision the implementation of 
such conditionalities in the absence of ratification of the Convention by all 
members of the G8.   
11
  In the context created by globalization, in which domestic economic interests 
are increasingly fragmented, it is more accurate to refer to the economic interests 
of politically decisive national pluralities or coalitions. 
12
  Falk has epitomized the adherents of this position for two generations, from a 
crucial volume that condemned the conduct of US military forces in Vietnam 
(Falk, Kolko, & Lifton, eds. 1971) to more recent work on the  relevance of 
human rights in international relations (Falk, 2000) and the need for ‘a regulatory 
framework for global market forces that is people-centred rather than capital-
driven’ (Falk, 1996, p. 18). Scholar-activist Susan George, who first achieved 
international acclaim for a study of the political economy of hunger and nutrition-
related illness (George, 1976), received the International Studies Association’s 
first Outstanding Public Scholar award.   
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